Wayzata World Factbook 1996/The World Factbook - 1996 Edition - Wayzata Technology (3079) (1996).iso/pc/text/humanrts/tajikist.txt

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TITLE:  TAJIKISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995

                           TAJIKISTAN


The Government of Supreme Soviet Chairman and Head of State
Emomili Rahmonov, composed of a coalition dominated by Tajiks
from the Kulyab region who were victorious in the 1992 civil
war, continued in power.  Fraud and intimidation marred the
presidential election on November 6; the Government declared
Rahmonov the winner with 58 percent of the vote.  Also on
November 6, a new Constitution, a significant improvement over
the Soviet-era document, was overwhelmingly approved in a
popular referendum.

The opposition coalition of nationalists and Islamic groups
defeated in the 1992 civil war boycotted the election and
continued to wage a bloody insurgency along the Tajikistan-
Afghanistan border and in the southeastern district of
Tavildara.  Under United Nations auspices, the Government and
the opposition engaged in several rounds of talks which led to
a prisoner exchange, a provisional cease-fire, and
establishment of joint commissions to monitor refugee issues
and the cease-fire and a United Nations Mission of Observers to
Tajikistan (UNMOT).  The cease-fire began on October 20 and
remained in effect through the end of the year, although
several alleged violations were reported by both sides.

Internal security is the responsibility of the Ministries of
the Interior, Security, and Defense.  The Russian Army's 201st
Motorized Rifle Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained
in the country.  This unit and the Border Guards, composed of
forces from Tajikistan and several CIS members but dominated by
Russian border forces, were responsible for guarding
Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.  Significant regions of
the country, however, remained effectively outside the
Government's control in 1994.  Opposition military units,
supported by an increasing number of Afghan and Arab Islamic
mercenaries, used parts of the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous
Region for training and as a base for launching their September
offensive against the Tavildara district.  The September
fighting was the fiercest since the formal end of the civil war
in 1992 and produced a large number of refugees.

The economy, which is centrally planned and highly dependent on
cotton, virtually collapsed, with up to 70 percent of industry
standing idle by year's end.  Despite a series of loans from
Russia, the Government fell months behind in paying salaries
and pensions.  There were critical shortages of fuel for
heating, transport, and industry.  Uzbekistan periodically
suspended natural gas sales to Tajikistan for nonpayment of
bills.  Shortages of wheat and flour led to social unrest in
Dushanbe, the capital, and other cities in October and November.

Both Government and government-related forces committed
widespread human rights abuses, including scores of brutal
political assassinations and the torture and beating of
detainees and prisoners.  Progovernment forces allegedly killed
several mullahs with ties to the Islamic Revival Party (IRP).
There were credible reports that progovernment militia forces,
notably the loosely controlled "Faisali Brigade," terrorized
noncombatants in Tavildara district, beating, raping, and
killing civilians and looting their homes.  The Government
prosecuted no one for political or extrajudicial killings in
1994, and the Procurator General's office closed all cases in
which alleged murderers were from the same region as the ruling
Kulyabis.  Opposition forces reportedly murdered several
Russian army officers and attacked buses carrying dependents of
Russian military personnel.  Both sides executed prisoners.

The Government severely restricts freedom of speech and press
freedom and completely controls the electronic media.  No
genuine opposition media appeared during the year.  Three new
political parties were allowed to register in 1994; four
opposition parties affiliated with the armed opposition
remained suspended.  The Government allowed Human Rights
Watch/Helsinki and the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) to open offices in Dushanbe.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Extrajudicial Killing

There were a substantial number of extrajudicial killings, but
fewer than in 1993.  Newspaper reports and international
agencies put the number at between 80 and 100.  The primary
culprits are the paramilitary groups which were not disarmed or
disbanded after the war.  While the Government has attempted to
incorporate these groups into the recently created Ministry of
Defense, many groups operated well outside government control
as informal militias and private armies.  According to credible
reports, these groups operated with the tacit approval of some
high-ranking officials within the Government, including the
Minister of the Interior and officials at the Ministries of
Defense and Security.  No government or security official, the
majority of whom are ethnic Kulyabis, was prosecuted for an
extrajudicial killing.  If the alleged perpetrator of a crime
was of Kulyabi origin, the procurator's office dropped all
charges and closed the cases.

The Faisali Brigade, a militia group consolidated within the
Ministry of Defense after the war, killed civilians in the
Tavildara district during the height of fighting between
government and opposition forces.  The death toll eventually
reached several score.  The Government withdrew the Brigade in
September (see Section 1.g.).

Conflict between political rivals and factions within the
ruling coalition is believed responsible for numerous killings
of prominent businessmen and political figures.  In February a
deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, M. Nazershoev, a
Pamiri, was murdered near his home ostensibly for supporting
negotiations with the opposition.  He was to have been a member
of the delegation to the first round of talks.  In April
unknown assailants, possibly representing hardline government
elements, riddled the home of the Foreign Minister with
automatic weapons fire in an unsuccessful attempt on his life.

In several instances, paramilitary leaders escaped even the
nominal control of the Government and became warlords,
maintaining private armies and battling over territory and
economic riches.  At the urging of the international community,
the Government successfully disarmed one warlord in Hissar who
had been terrorizing local residents, stealing, beating, and
killing those who protested.  In the two districts of Gorno
Badakhshan controlled by the opposition, warlords also operated
independently.  One warlord hijacked convoys of humanitarian
aid provided by international nongovernmental organizations,
killing several drivers.  Others fought among themselves or
with Russian border guards in defiance of orders from the
opposition's external political leadership.

In late May and early June, a series of assassinations of
ethnic Russian military officers in Dushanbe left six officers
dead.  Many within the Government claim that opposition forces,
using terror tactics, were responsible for at least some
deaths.  In June opposition elements fired a rocket launcher at
a bus carrying the wives and children of Russian border guards,
killing one pedestrian.  In October they launched a rocket-
propelled grenade into a Russian military bus, killing one
officer and wounding several others.  Also in October, Deputy
Prime Minister Munavvarsho Nazriyev was killed in his home
district of Garm when his car ran over a land mine, probably
placed by an opposition group.

In September, according to some credible reports, members of
the Faisali Brigade tortured and killed Mullah Eshon Said
Ashraf Shah Abdullohadov in Kurgan Tyube prison.  Mullah
Ashraf, in prison for allegedly supporting those seeking to
overthrow the Government, was on the opposition's list of 52
prisoners whom the Government had agreed to release under the
September 17 prisoner exchange agreement.  The Procurator
General's office said that the sexagenarian Mullah Ashraf had
died in prison on September 21 as a result of a heart attack.
However, his body was never given to the family for burial, nor
was an impartial autopsy allowed.

Another prisoner on the opposition list scheduled for exchange,
Mullah Ajik Aliev, was executed in prison, allegedly on
September 15.  There is strong suspicion, however, that he was
killed after the September 17 signing of the cease-fire and
prisoner exchange agreement.  Aliev, former IRP chairman in the
Khatlon district, had been sentenced to death on August 25,
1993, for terrorism, treason, and conspiring to overthrow the
Government.

Progovernment forces are credibly believed to be responsible
for the murders in February of Mullah Imkomuddin and Mullah
Abdul Rahim.  Both were active in the IRP, and Imkomuddin, who
had returned to Dushanbe after hiding in Komsomolobad, died of
wounds sustained during a severe beating.

     b.  Disappearance

The disappearance of Garmi- and Pamiri-origin men continued,
although at a lower rate than in 1993.  The number of returned
refugees who disappeared greatly decreased.  In many cases,
those thought to have disappeared had in fact been conscripted
as part of a government policy actively pursued in August and
September in response to increased fighting both on the
Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and in the Tavildara district.
Young men were rounded up on the streets and in night raids on
their homes.  Several Dushanbe newspapers estimated that at
least 60 men and women had disappeared, aside from any
conscripted, in the first half of 1994.

The Government has been unwilling to investigate claims of
disappearances seriously, asserting that the Procurator
General's office does not have sufficient resources for the
purpose.

In December 1993, unknown assailants abducted Tagobek Shukurov,
a sitting judge and Supreme Soviet member from Kolkhozobod, who
had been a member of the People's Front during the war and had
supported the return of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan.  He
remained missing throughout the year and is now presumed dead.

The 1993 disappearance of Dr. Ayniddin Sadykov, a noted surgeon
and chairman of the Dushanbe branch of the Democratic Party,
remained unsolved throughout 1994.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

Security officials, particularly those in the Ministry of the
Interior, regularly beat detainees in custody.  Security forces
were responsible for the widespread use of systematic beatings
and, in some instances, the torture of prisoners and
detainees.  Human rights groups reported that, in some cases,
mistreatment increased if victims made formal allegations of
abuse.

Female detainees were frequently subject to rape or the threat
of rape.  For example, one woman, detained for the alleged
distribution of antigovernment leaflets, was beaten while in
custody and eventually forced to confess on threat of being
raped in front of her young daughter.  Credible sources
reported that the members of the Faisali Brigade raped women in
villages under its control during the Tavildara campaign, in
one instance beating, raping, and then burning one woman to
death.

Prison conditions in Tajikistan declined markedly, primarily
due to a shortage of government resources.  Food, never
plentiful, became even more scarce, leading to an increase in
malnutrition and disease among prisoners.  Visitors to one
prison found officials well-intentioned but hopelessly
ill-equipped to care for the prisoners.  A followup visit to
the same prison found conditions improved, due to an amnesty
which relieved overcrowding and medicines donated by
international relief groups.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Criminal Code has not been significantly amended since
independence, and it therefore retains many of the defects
inherited from Soviet times.  The system allows for lengthy
pretrial detention and provides few checks on the power of
procurators and police to arrest persons.  The Government
continued to arrest political opponents arbitrarily and is
widely known to hold prisoners in incommunicado detention.
Public order, which broke down during the civil war, has yet to
be fully restored, and the virtual immunity from prosecution of
armed militia groups has further eroded the integrity of the
legal system.

Legally, police may detain persons arbitrarily and without a
warrant for a period of 72 hours, and the procurator's office
may do so for a period of 10 days after which the accused must
be officially charged.  At that point, the Criminal Code
permits pretrial detention for up to 15 months.   The first 3
months of detention is at the discretion of the local
procurator, the second 3 months must be approved at the
regional level, and the Procurator General must sanction the
remaining time in detention.  The Criminal Code maintains that
all investigations must be completed 1 month before the
15-month maximum in order to allow the defense time to examine
government evidence.  There is no requirement for judicial
approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the charge or
detention.  In criminal cases, detainees may be released and
restricted to their place of residence pending trial.

Allegations abounded of illegal government detention, well
beyond the maximum allowed by law.  In one well-known example,
security forces arrested four journalists in January 1993--
Mirbobo Mirakhimov, Khurshed Nazarov, Khayriddin Kasymov, and
Akhmadsho Komilov--and held them for 18 months before their
trial began in May 1994.  The trial was never completed as the
four were among those released in the November 12 prisoner
exchange; the charges against them were presumably dropped.

Once a case is entered for trial, the law states that it must
be brought before a judge within 28 days.  However, it is
common for cases to languish for many months before the trial
begins.  For example, the ongoing case of Oynihol Bobonazarova,
placed under house arrest in 1993 pending resolution of the
continuing investigation of alleged antigovernment activities
during 1992, has not yet been concluded.

The Government routinely uses arbitrary detention against those
expressing views contrary to official policy.  Security forces
routinely rounded up members of opposition political parties
for questioning.  In most cases, they do not obtain arrest
warrants and do not bring charges.  In August security forces,
allegedly looking for opposition sympathizers, cordoned off
streets and conducted house-to-house searches in the Yuzhni and
Avoul districts of Dushanbe, detaining eight young men (see
also Section 1.f.).  One remains in government custody, charged
with possession of two hand grenades allegedly found during a
warrantless search; six were released; and the last, Dashtov
Ismanbek, died in detention.  Security forces alleged that he
died while trying to escape by jumping out of a third-story
window.  Those released claimed they were mistreated and beaten
during their detention.

In August security forces detained two journalists, Makhsoud
Huseinov and Muhammad Rahim Saidar, for allegedly distributing
the pro-opposition newspaper Charoghi Ruz.  Huseinov and Saidar
were informed that distribution of Charoghi Ruz was illegal,
although the Government had never officially banned it.  While
in detention, Huseinov was reportedly beaten.  Neither man was
ever charged with a crime, and both were released after several
days (see Section 2.a.).

Opposition sources maintain that security forces detained
hundreds of persons unlawfully without charge.  As Tajikistan
law precludes visits to persons in pretrial detention, it is
virtually impossible for any independent organization to
estimate the number of persons detained.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has not
been allowed access to all prisoners falling within its mandate
according to its standard criteria since the authorities
claimed, on legal grounds, that they could not guarantee access
to all nonconvicted prisoners.  Nevertheless, the ICRC was
able, in a specific context, to register and hold private talks
with 23 detainees held by the Government and 27 detainees held
by the opposition who were about to be liberated simultaneously
in the framework of an agreement achieved under the auspices of
the United Nations.

The Government proclaimed two amnesties which generally had a
limited scope and did not affect those detained for political
crimes.  Article 19 of the new Constitution states that no one
can be exiled without a legal basis; no laws have been passed
so far setting out any legal basis for exile.  Forced exile is
not known to be used.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The court system remains unmodified from the Soviet period.
There are several tiers of courts:  city, district, regional,
and republic levels, with a separate but parallel military
tribunal.  Higher courts serve as appellate courts for lower
ones.  Local, regional, and republic-level judges are, for the
most part, poorly trained and lack an understanding of
independent judicial function.  Judicial officials at all
levels of the court system are under constant heavy influence
from both the political leadership and, in many instances,
armed paramilitary groups.  The new Constitution establishes
additional courts, including a Constitutional Court, and states
that judges are independent and subordinate only to the
Constitution and the law; it prohibits interference in their
activities.  Provisions of the new Constitution concerning the
judicial system had not yet been implemented at the end of 1994.

According to the law, trials are public, except in certain
cases involving national security or the protection of minors.
The court will appoint an attorney for those who do not have
one.  A defendant may choose his or her own attorney but may
not necessarily choose among court-appointed defenders.
Arrested persons are often denied prompt, and in some cases
any, access to an attorney.

The procurator's office is responsible for conducting all
investigations of alleged criminal conduct.  In theory, both
defendant and counsel have the right to review all government
evidence, to confront witnesses, and to present evidence and
testimony.  No groups are barred from testifying, and all
testimony is theoretically given equal weight, regardless of
ethnicity or gender.  Ministry of Justice officials maintain
that defendants benefit from the presumption of innocence,
despite the unmodified Soviet legal statute which presumes the
guilt of all brought to trial.

The pressure exerted on the judicial system by armed
paramilitary groups and vigilantes who operate outside of
government control often leads to the dismissal of charges and
the dropping of cases.  A judge in Kurgan Tyube, Pamiri by
origin, was forced to flee with his family for attempting to
try the case of an armed band accused of beatings, murder, and
robbery.  The Procurator General's order closed the case.  The
Deputy Procurator General closed another case when it turned
out that the defendant, a member of a group accused of robbery
and the murders of 18 people, had fought for the Government
during the civil war.  While crimes allegedly committed by
progovernment groups go uninvestigated or unprosecuted, even
minor infractions by those whom the Government views as in
opposition are vigorously prosecuted.

Estimates of the number of political prisoners vary widely.
The armed opposition submitted a list of 29 political prisoners
at the Tehran round of the U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace
talks in June.  It later expanded its list to 52 at a September
session of talks in which both sides agreed to an exchange of
prisoners for prisoners of war (POW's).  In accord with a later
agreement reached on November 1, the Government exchanged 27
political prisoners for 27 POW's captured by the armed
opposition.  According to an international human rights
organization, scores of political prisoners remain in
government custody.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
         Correspondence

Articles 22 and 23 of the new Constitution and the Criminal
Code provide for the inviolability of the home and prohibit
interference with correspondence, telephone conversations, and
postal and communication rights, except "in cases prescribed by
law."  Police may not enter and search a private home without
the approval of the procurator.  In some cases, police may
enter and search a home without permission, but they must then
inform the procurator within 24 hours.  Police are permitted to
enter and search homes without permission if they have
compelling reason to believe a delay in obtaining a warrant
would impair national security.  There is no judicial review of
police searches conducted without a warrant.  In September the
penalties for the violation of the privacy of correspondence
were increased to several years in prison.  Also in September,
the Supreme Soviet raised the maximum sentence for invasion of
privacy of the home from between 2 and 5 years to between 5 and
8 years in prison.

Numerous examples of arbitrary illegal search and seizure by
government forces included the August raid by Interior Ministry
forces against a predominantly Garmi and Pamiri neighborhood in
the Yuzhni district of Dushanbe.  Security forces presented no
warrants as they rounded up young men, apparently at random,
and took them away.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
         Law in Internal Conflicts

The lower level of conflict in Tajikistan during 1994 provided
a commensurate lowering of the level of allegations of
excessive force.  However, the August-September campaign in
Tavildara saw many excesses committed by both sides in the
abuse of civilian populations and the confiscation of
humanitarian aid.  Neither government forces nor the opposition
have complete control over all elements ostensibly loyal to
them.  Government forces, most notably the Faisali Brigade,
swept the countryside in Vanch and upper Garm, according to one
witness, "like an army of occupation," looting, confiscating
crops, and beating and killing inhabitants allegedly
sympathetic to the opposition forces then active in the area.
On the other hand, government forces (other than the Faisali
Brigade) who operated further to the west maintained good
discipline, leaving the homes and property of evacuees largely
untouched.  Casualties among civilians were lower in 1994 as
the Government made efforts to evacuate civilians in areas of
its operations.

Hostilities in the Garm/Tavildara districts closed the only
road through the area several times, blocking convoys of
humanitarian aid and the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons.  Forces loyal to the opposition continued
indiscriminate raids on convoys of humanitarian aid destined
for refugees and internally displaced persons in Gorno
Badakhshan.  A notorious opposition leader named Jumah raided
convoys of food and medicine belonging to the Aga Khan
Foundation, World Food Program, Medicins sans Frontieres, and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
September and October.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

Despite Article 30 of the new Constitution and the 1991 law
protecting freedom of speech and press, the Government severely
restricts freedom of expression in practice.  Journalists,
broadcasters, and individual citizens who disagree with
government policies cannot speak freely or critically.  The
Government exercises complete control over the media both
overtly through legislation and less obviously through the
dismissal of journalists and broadcasters for their political
or ethical convictions and the closing of independent
journals.  The Government also controls the printing presses
and the supply of newsprint and broadcasting facilities, and
subsidizes virtually all publications and productions.  Editors
fearful of reprisals by armed elements loyal to the Government
exercise careful self-censorship.

Journalists remained prime targets for violence by both the
Government and opposition.  Progovernment forces are believed
to be responsible for the death of Haydarsho Khushvakt, the
strongly progovernment editor at the newspaper Jumhuriyat.
Although strongly progovernment himself, Khushvakt had written,
but not yet published, a series of articles on the
political-criminal mafia in Dushanbe which upset other
progovernment elements.  Opposition forces were probably
responsible for the murder in August of Davlatali Rakhmonov,
director of programming at the State Television and Radio
Committee and a strongly partisan Kulyabi.  In November the
editor in chief of the Uzbek-language weekly Haq Suz was
murdered at the entrance to his apartment building, probably in
connection with an internal Uzbek community dispute.  In yet
another instance, a grenade was thrown into the home of the
editor in chief of the Uzbek-language Communist Party paper,
wounding several members of his family.  The Government
informed the Committee for the Protection of Journalists in
September that investigations had been opened into all of the
deaths of journalists during 1992-94.

The Ministry of Security detained two journalists, Makhsoud
Huseinov of Sadoi Mardum and Muhammad Rahim Saidar, accusing
them of distributing the pro-opposition newspaper Charoghi Ruz
in August.  It also questioned several other alleged
distributors in connection with their activities relating to
Charoghi Ruz, which the Government has never officially
banned.  Huseinov and Saidar, against whom formal charges were
never brought, claimed that they were beaten while in custody
in an effort to extract information from them.

In September the regional executive committee in the northern
city of Leninabad closed the independent newspaper Ittihod for
allegedly printing several articles critical of the
Government.  The Government did not issue a formal ban but
simply cut off all supplies of newsprint.  Many journalists who
displeased the Government were fired.  Lack of pay forced those
who could to find work elsewhere.  The economic situation
allowed the Government to hold the newspapers hostage.  The
Government used the press freely as a vehicle to propagandize
on its own behalf and discredit its opponents.  For example, a
two-page article lambasting former Prime Minister Abdulmalik
Abdullajanov for alleged corruption was printed at the behest
of anti-Leninabad elements within the Government.

In direct contradiction to the 1991 law, the Supreme Soviet
passed a decree in February suspending the activity of all
independent electronic media until it adopted a new law on the
media.  The ban was ostensibly due to the unregulated amounts
of violence and pornography being shown on independent
television, but the effect was to muzzle the independent media
during a time of political change in the country.  All but 2 of
the 10 to 15 independent television stations, most of which are
sponsored either by large enterprises or local executive
committees, adhered to the ban and remained off the air for
most of 1994.  This precluded virtually any independent
television coverage of the inter-Tajik negotiations, the
military situation, or the election campaign.

Academic expression is limited to a certain extent by fear of
violent reprisals, but much more so by the complete reliance of
scientific institutes upon government funding.  Three
professors from Tajik State University remain either in hiding
or under arrest, although one, Oynihol Bobonazarova, former
dean of the law faculty, has been allowed to teach classes.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Article 29 of the new Constitution provides for freedom of
peaceful assembly.  However, the Government suspended that
right by the imposition of a state of emergency in all
districts of Tajikistan except for Leninabad province.  Thus,
all public demonstrations and gatherings were banned until the
state of emergency lapsed in August 1994.

Freedom of association is further circumscribed by the
requirement, in the law on nongovernmental associations, that
all organizations must first register with the Ministry of
Justice.  This process is often slowed by the cumbersome
necessity to submit all documents in both Russian and Tajik.
The Ministry of Justice's verification of the text inevitably
delays the final granting of registration.  In practice, the
authorities exercise strict control over organizations and
activities of a political nature, while free assembly and
association are permitted for nonpolitical associations,
including trade unions.